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1 This  recent  edition  of  A  Pluralistic  Universe  (1909),  edited  and  introduced  by
H. G. Callaway, is a recovery and a close examination of James’s pluralism. The editor
proposes a study edition of this famous text, which is the latest book published during
James’ lifetime. His long preface, his work on lexicon, his notes, and the attention he
gives to the historical background are great tools to pragmatism students and scholars
for critical reading. 
2 In this book, in many ways James argues against absolute monism and explains his
promotion of Pluralism, very well orchestrating the rhythm of partes destruens and pars
construens in  his  discourse.  His  strategy  is  to  make  his  audience  more  and  more
convinced about the insufficiency of idealism, as to give them concrete consistency of
the pluralistic alternative. He starts to notice that the idealistic Weltanschauung cannot
fully satisfy our need of feeling at home in the world, and it is this necessary to justify
James’s  attempt to  support  and encourage other  possible  choices.  In  fact,  although
empiricism and rationalism have – in a pantheistic sense – a spiritualistic vision in
common,  there  is  a  fundamental  discordance  between these  two philosophical  and
temperamental  portraits.  The  former  is,  indeed,  defined  by  James  as  “the  habit  of
explaining wholes by parts,” and the latter as the opposite “habit of explaining parts by
wholes” (5). As it is well known, the text moves from the assumption that our ways of
looking at the world are built on aesthetical and practical interests and that we reclaim
to the consequences of our preferences a necessitatis ratione. James maintains that we all
are led by beliefs that we try to support and justify in order to keep our beliefs going. In
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this process, he says, a certain finality always appears to be prior to other reasons,
since our ‘will to believe’ is strictly connected to our interested human nature.
3 The book is  based on a  series  of  lectures  James held at  Oxford University  in  1908.
Callaway focuses his attention on the continuation between James and Ralph Waldo
Emerson, both of whom had a main role in exporting American philosophy in England.
The editor  also  gives  an  important  account  of  the  historical  framework of  Hibbert
Lectures, considering the political and cultural context of United States before the first
World War. At that time British imperialism and European nationalism were at their
peak,  and  European  countries  contended  one  with  another  for  US  powerful  naval
army’s alliance. In the first conference James recollected USA and England common
cultural backgrounds and wished they returned to their common philosophical routes –
as classical empiricism was –, identifying their common enemy with the pedantic and
over-technical  German  academic  way  of  philosophizing.  Callaway  remarks  on  the
political tune running through the text, and he points out the famous and ambiguous
similarity proposed by James, the one saying that the pluralistic world is “more like a
federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom” (195).
 
Pluralism, Humanism and Nominalism
4 The philosophical critique to absolute monism is, however, the book’s very guideline.
James attacks such a theory both as it was acknowledged by Idealists of the end of the
XIX century and as it  was sustained by Hegel.  In On some Hegelisms (1882) James had
already expressed some objections to idealism and his ongoing questions seemed to be
whether ideal identity or concrete variety is the basis of our vision of the universe. He now
attempts to show pluralism as a pursuable view against rationalist metaphysics and its
main implications (determinism and perfectionism). 
5 As Callaway very well underlines, James is mainly concerned with the nature of relations:
he wants to state the possibility of external relations, which were completely excluded
from  monistic  idealism.  Absolute  idealists  didn’t  believe  a  universe  made  up  of
“collective or addicted form” is real, but they thought there could only be what James
called  a  “block-universe.”  This  refers  to  a  reality  thoroughly  and  systematically
predetermined in its parts from the all. In his discussion James is, of course, referring
to metaphysics quarrels on the nature of universals, but his socio-political concerns
can also be detected in his arguments. Callaway tries to separately follow these two
lines  of  analysis  –  theoretical  and political  –  of  the book,  beginning with a  critical
inquiry of the identitarian implications of James’s pluralism on theoretical and social
levels. According to pluralism:
there may ultimately never be an all-form at all, that the substance of reality may
never get totally collected, […] and that a distributive form of reality, the each-form,
is  logically  as  acceptable and empirically  as  probable as  the all-form commonly
acquiesced in as so obviously the self-evident thing. The contrast between these
two forms of a reality which we agree to suppose substantially spiritual is the topic
of this course of lectures. (21)
6 James’s pluralistic view contests that an absolute logical union of reality could never be
possible, and he makes clear his thought denying the possibility of exclusive “internal
relations,” which means relations only internal to their terms. Conceptual identity can
never fully grasp reality in all of its variety. Such a view should be also considered the
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core of James nominalist temptation. As Callaway sustains, nominalism is in accordance
with  classic  pragmatist  fallibilism,  which  is  a methodological  and  theoretical  view
through which our theories and scientific laws should always leave margins for growth
and revision. There is nothing in our universe that can be considered definitive a priori,
neither in our scientific knowledge, nor in our social bonds or identitarian relations.
The pluralist suggests that reality is not a complete unity, all connected and perfect,
but  there  is  always  something  escaping  from  our  knowledge:  something  “not  yet
considered.” Pragmatist  anti-essentialism and humanism, as clearly disclosed in the
preface of this edition, are important to corroborate the conviction that doesn’t exist
such a previous nature of the world, something ready-made and absolute; it is time to
figure out another image of human relations where ideas don’t fall down from above,
but human beings are “real causes in nature.”
7 According to one of James’s most persistent and original claims of all his psychological
and philosophical thought, potentialities of human agency should be considered the
center  of  our  natural  dimension.  Callaway  proposes  a  careful  analysis  of  James’s
critique to what is  called ‘vicious intellectualism’  –  as  it  is  variously declined from
absolute monists –, which represents a very helpful and convincing contribution of his
preface to discussions on the text. By the words ‘vicious intellectualism’ James meant:
The  treating  of  a  name  as  excluding  from  the  fact  named  what  the  name’s
definition fails positively to include, is what I call ‘vicious intellectualism.’ (38)
8 Such  a  “radical  rationalism”  is at  odds  with  James’  radical  empiricism  hence  the
priority he gave to perception compared to the conceptual dimension. James took into
account many idealist authors and bitterly criticized their fallacies. They are all used to
go from one extreme to another suggesting false dilemmas, thus reducing ad absurdum
the thesis they disagree with. They mean only absolute independence by accident, so
that if relations have to be accidental, these authors can easily understand that it is
impossible to connect parts with one each other. In reverse, assuming that relations
can only be essential, they can say that the absolute union of all things is necessary. In
particular James analyses Lotze, Royce and Bradley’s arguments. Lotze attempted to
develop a spiritualistic conception of reality, gaining hints to Leibniz’s monadism and
pluralism.  But,  in the end he grew so concerned about avoiding the same pluralist
outcomes  of  his  own  theory  that  he  tried  to  recover  the  Unity  of  all  beings  and
processes through his  analysis  of  the empirical  nature of  interaction.  James retains
Lotze’s concept of interaction among independent elements as a pure verbal operation,
it is a vain attempt to introduce the logical level of reasoning to avoid contradiction in
his  theory.1 James  did  not  believe  such  an  abstract  and  speculative  approach  was
required. Reality – he said – is already coherent and he wonders why we should look for
a noumenic identity to fund and explain the phenomenic continuity. 
9 His comparison with Hegel’s theories, started in his article published in 1882 on “Mind”
and later in The Will to Believe (1897), is the true background of James’s thought about
pluralism.  He  is  now  definitively  refusing  to  assume  knowledge  to  be  total  and
complete,  as  far  as  to  negate  everything,  which  is  not  positively  included  in  the
conceptual  knowledge  of  something.  In  James’s  view,  this  kind  of  double  negation
activates the Hegelian dialectic process: 
Now Hegel himself, in building up his method of double negation, offers the vividest
possible example of this vice of intellectualism. Every idea of a finite thing is of
course a concept of that thing and not a concept of anything else. But Hegel treats
this not being a concept of anything else as if it were equivalent to the concept of
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anything  else  not  being,  or  in  other  words  as  if  it  were  a  denial  or  negation  of
everything else. Then, as the other things, thus implicitly contradicted by the thing
first conceived, also by the same law contradict it, the pulse of dialectic commences
to beat and the famous triads begin to grind out the cosmos. (66)
10 James  uses  the  phrase  “vicious  intellectualism”  to  explain  this  general  defect  of
absolutistic  reasoning.  He  believes  the  Hegelian  system  is  based  on  the identity  of
contradictories’ principle and the principle of totality. This second principle states that to
know  one  part,  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  totality  of  that  part.  In  1882  James
underlined the ‘abstractness’  and logical  fallacies  of  Hegelian definitions  which the
famous philosopher made to reach his conclusions. James was particularly upset by the
fact that Hegel did not distinguish the respect under which he used terms. In regard to
this critique,  Callaway points out pivotal  passages where James’s  nominalist  drift  is
undeniable. He is also interested in stressing James’ nominalist inclination to remark a
great  distinction  between  the  view  of  the  American  philosopher  and  his  famous
colleague, R. W. Emerson. 
 
James and Emerson
11 The comparison between James and Emerson is a very appealing feature of Callaway’s
preface and, of course, his research interests.2 The great work he did on lexicon and
historical context is valuable, it allows students to approach these texts more easily.
Here  he  states  that  despite  their  discontinuity  about  nominalism,  both  James  and
Emerson sustained, more or less consciously, forms of pluralism. The orator of Concord
was a good friend of James’s father, their friendship was due to their common ties with
Transcendentalism  and  in  fact  common  to  both  Emerson  and  James  was  a  certain
emphasis on spiritual rebirth and the aversion to passive fatalism. Notwithstanding,
James considered Emerson’s idea of Absolute so close to the Hegelians’ one and he did
not  feel  at  ease  with  such  an  idea  of  transcendence,  suggesting  a  reality  which  is
‘unexperiencable.’ As a matter of fact, James associates idealistic absolutism with some
kind of unavoidable predetermination. And, because of this linkage, he just could not
easily hold the attention Emerson gave to individuality together with his faith in a
divine plan. 
12 In Callaway’s closer analysis, Emerson is an anti-predestinationalist and a convinced
anti-nominalist.  The  Emersonian  meliorism  was  routed  in  his  realistic  thinking  of
natural and moral law, which he considered to be in fieri. Such a belief contrasts with
the nominalist temptation we recognize in James’s pluralism and in his psychological
interests, as well. Callaway also points out that with James there is neither the same
stress Emerson put on Law, nor the same attention he gave to connections between
human individual freedom and our growing skill in understanding Laws. 
13 James  and  Emerson  clearly  shared  a  similar  attention  to  individuality  as  much  as
Callaway  can  talk  about  radical  pluralism for  both  of  them.  He  also  considers  how
Emerson was less conscious of his own pluralistic outcomes than, of course, James was.
Moreover, their perspectives remain different in regards to the rule they gave to action:
James focused on the importance of human activity to freedom as much as Emerson
emphasized  its  theoretical  development,  though  Emerson  maintained  in  his  proto-
pragmatism style that ‘every thought is for the sake of action.’ In a nutshell, Callaway
considers Emerson to be still anchored in Platonic and Neo-Platonic tradition, while
William James, A Pluralistic Universe
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IV-2 | 2012
4
James  decidedly  kept  away  from  that  philosophical  view.  In  conclusion,  it  is  also
important  to  remember  the  critical  attitude  these  two  thinkers  shared  towards
contemporary forms of political imperialism.
 
Pluralism in United States of America nowadays
14 The alternative between absolutism and pluralism, which James strived to mark out at
a  philosophical  level,  can  also  be  considered  a  very  useful  tool  to  investigate
contemporary American socio-political order and its historical issues. In this spirit, on
a political level, Callaway retains the quest for an ideal “organic unity” to be taken
primarily as a philosophical mistake: we need to keep in mind that this idea is just an
insidious and dangerous abstraction which does not  help the USA to gain concrete
equilibrium  between  the  unity  of  the  country  and  the  diversity of  its  constitutive
elements. From James’s achievements on, variety has always been retained a source for
America, which is a country that is from its foundation searching for a balance between
nationalism and federalism. As James stated, the “ever not quite” should be a monitum
stating that a space for difference and its growth is always to be preserved. Even if
difference is not a good in itself, we can anyway consider it a potentiality to protect:
only  through  difference  we  can  develop  and  enrich  our  cultural  and  political
exchanges, hence bringing meliorisms into our society. 
15 American national identity is not set on models of ethnic or religious routes, it has
never  been  a  homogeneous  unity  but  a  created  one:  “One  from  Many.”  Such  an
historical formation allows American society how important it is to combine the best
qualities  of  every single  group and persons through democratic  procedures.  It  also
permits  them  to  achieve  new  goals  which  couldn’t  be  realized  independently.  As
Callaway highlights, there is a nominalist tendency first in James and then in Dewey
stressing the experiential and individual side in regards to the legal one. This does not
mean democracy can be morally vacant. Instead, it should always be ruled and led from
institutions.  A  democratic  society  needs  laws  to  guarantee  our  possibility  of  living
together, but it also needs uniformity and suppression of pluralities to be avoided. If
constitution  preserves  freedom  and  diversities,  it  is  also  useful  to  control  their
excesses. Callaway retains constitutional tradition to be a shelter against any possible
excess committed by the majority of the Congress. He considers auto-formation and
civil  organization  –  often  based  on  models  of  religious  congregations  –  to  be
fundamental. In the end it is important to notice, as Callaway does, that democracy and
pluralism need a ground of shared moral values to be preserved, because institutional
procedures alone cannot totally control neither forms of excessive centralization of
power nor lobbyists’ pressures.
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